International trade in a polarized world - lessons from history (2): regime change as trade policy

In the first six months of the second Trump presidency, the US president and vice-president made several public remarks about foreign elections. They openly supported right-wing political candidates in elections that were held in Canada, Germany and Romania. The Trump administration backs far-right European politicians who seek to transform the policies of their countries, and the EU as well. This ambition corresponds with Trump’s views on international trade, which focus mostly on cutting back the US trade deficit and reviving its domestic production of commodities. Moreover, there is a clear preference for bilateralism over multilateralism.

In this respect, the goal of influencing the governments of trading partners is part of a political and economic agenda. This strategy is different from, for example, a trade embargo or waging a war to install a more favourable regime. One then wonders, has this ever happened before? Does history provide examples of comparable events and situations?

History books teem with succession crises. When a ruler approached death and had no clear successor, it was normal that neighbouring countries tried to influence the process of succession in their favour. The Spanish Succession war (1701-1714) and the Austrian Succession War (1740-1748) are examples thereof. In the Spanish Succession War, England’s opposition to the French-Spanish union paid off with the acquisition of the asiento de negros, which granted a monopoly on the slave trade to Spain’s American colonies. The Austrian Succession War involved a confrontation between England and France, who were competing for trade routes and colonies overseas, in particular in North America. Austria grew in importance and adopted trading policies that were potentialy harmful to the two powers mentioned. Further back in time, the French-Breton war of 1487-1491 was an international war in which not only France and England were involved but also the Holy Roman Empire and Castile. In this war, the control over the salt trade from Brittany was a crucial factor.

And there were instances in which rulers supported rebels in neighbouring countries, for reasons of international trade. It is well known that from the 1960s onwards the US supported leaders, often with a record of violating human rights, in South America, Africa and Southeast Asia, to secure their trade interests. Of course, the transition from one regime to another was not exclusively due to US influence. However, such influence could matter greatly. In the Middle Ages, some revolts were supported by foreign leaders in attempts to alter coalitions of international trade. The rebellions in Flanders in 1300-1302 and 1323-1328 went together with covert support from England. These uprises were rooted in deteriorating economic and living conditions, which caused social unrest. They targeted the counts of Flanders, at the time vazals of the French king. Flanders was the main export market for English wool and therefore of crucial importance for the English Crown. In the same period of 1327-1328, the French King Philip IV had a hand in the deposing of the English King Edward II, by means of William of Hainaut, who was his son-in-law.

The reasons for the hiding of support are clear. Rebels did not want to have the stigma of traitors; they presented themselves as the true protectors of the common good and avoided to be associated with foreign powers, to prevent an image of dependence. Also from the part of the foreign intervening country there were good reasons not to openly support rebel factions in other countries. In case they lost their cause, the prevailing regime could use the evidence of foreign interventions against them, as well as against the supporting nation.

Dynastic rule in medieval and early modern Europe did not preclude interference from foreign powers. Rebellions and palace coups were regular events. When they happened, trading partners quickly had to assess the chances of their success. If the revolt was expected to fail, it could be beneficial to come in in support of the monarch in distress. For example, Brabantine cities sided with regent-lord Maximilian of Habsburg when he was imprisoned in Bruges in 1488. At the time, it was quite clear that the actions of Bruges would fail.

Important powers could seek to control smaller states that were strategically located or which produced unique products. In 1337, the Hundred Years’ War erupted over claims of both the king of France and England over Gascony and Aquitaine, an important wine-producing region. And in the early sixteenth century several wars were waged between Denmark, Sweden and Lübeck over the control of the strait of the Sond, which connected the Baltic trade with Western Europe.

Other strategies could encompass intermarriage. Daughters could be wed to throne pretendents. This strategy could bring a country into a close alliance, while it remained formally independent. From the early fifteenth century forwards, this was the case with Brittany, which remained allied to France for most of this period until its formal integration in the latter kingdom in 1532. Another example: from the middle of the fifteenth century, the bishop of Utrecht was a member of the Burgundian house. He was lord of the Sticht, which encompassed important trading cities such as Kampen and Deventer. Claims on Utrecht made by the Burgundian House were partially motivated by trading interests. Utrecht remained formally independent, yet it was closely allied to the most important principalities of the Low Countries, all of which had a Burgundian lord (Flanders, Brabant, Holland and Zeeland).  

History shows that international trade could be companied with other tactics than diplomacy, reprisals or war. A search for control could incite secret support; however, power play was often camouflaged, in order to increase chances of success and to avoid adverse consequences of a potential failure. It seems that throughout history covert interference happened mostly in regard of states that were smaller and which most naturally sought coalitions with greater powers. The secretive nature of influencing operations therefore also followed from an agenda to prevent confrontation with the other powers that had comparable interests vis-à-vis the smaller state.

Bibliography:

W. Bain, Medieval Foundations of International Relations, London, Routledge, 2017.

R. Cintre, Les marchés de Bretagne au Moyen Âge: économie, guerre et société en pays de frontière (XIVe-XVe siècles), Rennes, 1992.

E. Gartzke and J.J. Zhang, “Trade and War” in L.L Martin (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade, Oxford, 2015, 419-438.

J. Wink, Het thuisfront springt bij. Stad, gewest en vorst op de bres voor kooplieden uit Kampen, Utrecht en Zutphen in den vreemde (ca. 1440-1560), PhD dissertation VU Amsterdam 2025.